{"id":16248,"date":"2025-03-12T22:48:58","date_gmt":"2025-03-12T22:48:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/?p=16248"},"modified":"2025-05-03T09:14:06","modified_gmt":"2025-05-03T09:14:06","slug":"african-union-peacekeepers-in-somalia-accused-of-widespread-abuse","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/2025\/03\/12\/african-union-peacekeepers-in-somalia-accused-of-widespread-abuse\/","title":{"rendered":"African Union peacekeepers in Somalia accused of widespread abuse"},"content":{"rendered":"

A new African Union peace enforcement mission, known by its acronym AUSSOM, was launched at the beginning of the year to support a fragile Somali government that has struggled against a\u00a0jihadist insurgency<\/span>\u00a0entrenched in the countryside.<\/p>\n

AUSSOM is the\u00a0third iteration<\/span>\u00a0of a multinational combat force first deployed in Somalia in 2007. Yet, like its predecessors (AMISOM and ATMIS), it is weighed down by popular misgivings over the human rights record of its soldiers, and the blanket immunity they operate under \u2013 which in most cases prevents Somali citizens from winning legal redress for crimes committed.<\/p>\n

AU forces are credited with keeping successive Somali governments in power. In gruelling\u00a0house-to-house urban warfare<\/span>\u00a0in 2011, AMISOM managed to push al-Shabab out of the capital, Mogadishu, and took significant losses in the process. It went on to secure most major cities in south-central Somalia, before switching to a less ambitious garrison-based approach.<\/p>\n

In 2022, it was\u00a0re-badged<\/span>\u00a0as an 18-000-strong ATMIS mission. Although \u201cdegrading\u201d al-Shabab remained a goal, its\u00a0core rationale<\/span>\u00a0was one of transition \u2013 building the capacity of Somali\u2019s security forces and local institutions to pave the way for its exit.<\/p>\n

AUSSOM<\/span>\u00a0is the new acronym for essentially the same mission. However, it operates with fewer soldiers \u2013 around 12,000 \u2013 uncertain financing, a lack of clarity on\u00a0troop-contributing nations<\/span>, and a five-year window to complete the transition. Much of AUSSOM\u2019s benchmarks will also be\u00a0predicated on the buy-in<\/span>\u00a0of the Somali government and a political class over which it has only limited sway.<\/p>\n

Public support is crucial to any counterinsurgency operation. But the AU\u2019s near-two-decade-long intervention in Somalia has been mired in controversy. Some of its forces have been accused of abuse \u2013 including\u00a0execution-style killings<\/span>,\u00a0rape<\/span>, and indiscriminate\u00a0airstrikes<\/span>. Soldiers have also been involved in criminal rackets, ranging from\u00a0illicit arm sales<\/span>\u00a0to\u00a0fuel theft.<\/span><\/p>\n

However, the violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) by AU forces have been on a\u00a0<\/span><\/a>far smaller scale than abuses committed by al-Shabab, clan militias, or government security forces,\u00a0according to a report<\/span>\u00a0by the\u00a0Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the cases of extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, and excessive use of force \u201chave fostered deep-seated resentment among much of the Somali population\u201d, said Jethro Norman, a researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies. \u201cA perceived lack of accountability has only worsened this distrust \u2013 reinforcing the belief that AU troops can act with impunity.\u201d<\/p>\n

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Several high-profile cases have shocked the Somali public over the years. They have included the\u00a0reported beheading<\/span>\u00a0of two civilians by Ugandan AU troops last year in the town of Bulo-Marer in the southern Lower Shabelle region, and the execution in 2021 of\u00a0seven farmers<\/span>\u00a0\u2013 including a respected community leader \u2013 in Golweyn, also in Lower Shabelle, after Ugandan troops had been ambushed on a nearby road.<\/p>\n

Some of the victims\u2019 bodies in Golweyn were stacked on top of each other and then blown up \u2013 violating international codes on the\u00a0treatment of human remains<\/span>.<\/p>\n

The New Humanitarian has interviewed nearly a dozen people who all alleged that they, or their deceased relatives, were the victims of beatings or killings by AU peacekeepers. In all the cases investigated, none of the soldiers involved were convicted and no compensation was provided to the victims\u2019 families.<\/p>\n

Despite repeated emails to AUSSOM, The New Humanitarian did not get a response to the allegations before publication.<\/p>\n

Worldwide, civilian deaths during counter-insurgency operations are unconscionably common. Yet security forces tend to escape punishment. From killings by UK troops in\u00a0Northern Ireland<\/span>, to NATO air and ground operations in\u00a0Afghanistan<\/span>\u00a0and Iraq, a history of uninvestigated actions has left grieving families without justice or closure.<\/p>\n

In Somalia, that impunity has soured relations between AU forces and the Somali public \u2013 to the benefit of al-Shabab, which projects a powerful nationalist narrative.<\/p>\n

Its record has also complicated the AU\u2019s long-standing goal of securing UN-assessed contributions to finance its peace operations. Earlier negotiations within the world body\u00a0foundered<\/span>\u00a0in part over whether the missions would comply with IHL.<\/p>\n

Yet the AU has made progress in developing\u00a0codes of conduct<\/span>\u00a0and tightening disciplinary processes. It has, for example, banned the use of indirect artillery fire \u2013 where the target is not in line of sight \u2013 and formally adopted a zero tolerance position on\u00a0sexual exploitation<\/span>\u00a0and abuse.<\/p>\n

\u201cWhen it comes to compliance with human rights and IHL, as a result of very terrible experiences, lessons have been learnt and there have been a lot of institutional development,\u201d Solomon Dersso, director of the think-tank Amani Africa, told The New Humanitarian.<\/p>\n

That helped pave the way, in December 2023, for Security Council Resolution 2719, which created a framework for the UN to finance 75% of the cost of AU operations \u2013 although it\u2019s unlikely a\u00a0United States objection<\/span>\u00a0can be overcome and the mechanism adopted to fund AUSSOM.<\/p>\n

Soldiers shielded from prosecution<\/strong><\/p>\n

Dahir Mohamed Ali is a senior human rights lawyer with the Heegan law firm in Mogadishu. He is representing the families of the victims of what has become known as the Qoryooley massacre, in which Ugandan AMISOM troops opened fire on a minibus near the town of Qoryooley in 2016, killing six civilians. The soldiers also torched the vehicle.<\/p>\n

The case generated plenty of media attention and attracted the support of the\u00a0speaker of parliament, MPs, and some government ministers. AMISOM accepted responsibility and said they would pay compensation, according to documents seen by The New Humanitarian. But there have been no prosecutions or financial restitution for the families, said Ali.<\/p>\n

At the heart of the problem is the\u00a0Status of Mission Agreement<\/span>\u00a0(SOMA) signed between the Somali government and the AU in 2007, granting blanket immunity to AU forces. Although the SOMA commits AMISOM soldiers to abide by all Geneva Conventions, they are also immune from any legal process in Somalia.<\/p>\n

Instead, AMISOM soldiers fall under the \u201cexclusive jurisdiction\u201d of their respective countries regarding \u201cany criminal offences which may be committed by them\u201d in Somalia. UN peacekeepers worldwide are similarly indemnified.<\/p>\n

\u201cThere have been numerous cases of AU killings that have been taken up with local courts, and taken up by MPs, but there has been no compensation, let alone accountability,\u201d Ali told The New Humanitarian.<\/p>\n

Golweyn is an example that even courts with jurisdiction may hesitate to prosecute to the fullest extent of the law. The Ugandan soldiers involved in the killings were eventually court-martialled, with two sentenced to death. But the Ugandan appeals court quashed that verdict \u2013 although all the men have been sentenced to long stretches in prison.<\/p>\n

While Qoryooley and Golweyn made the headlines, the reality for most victims is a silent suffering \u2013 either out of fear of retribution, or because their cases have never come to light.<\/p>\n

\u201cMost of the cases of human rights abuses committed by AU forces in Somalia have gone unreported and undocumented,\u201d said Ali. \u201cMost civilian victims don\u2019t have access to the government, or the head of the AU mission [to lodge a complaint]: There is nobody to defend their rights or fight their case.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cAUSSOM is the same as ATMIS and AMISOM\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

Clare Brown is an independent human rights lawyer who has worked in Somalia for over a decade researching and defending victims of human rights abuse. She, along with a number of NGOs, have been collaborating with AU forces to bolster their internal accountability procedures to allow civilians to report incidents of abuse.<\/p>\n

The main mechanism is the AU\u2019s Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis, and Response Cell (CCTARC), set up to track violations. But it has no independent funds to pay compensation, there is a complicated reporting procedure, and, more fundamentally, it has\u00a0not been prioritised<\/span>\u00a0by the mission, troop-contributing countries, or donors.<\/p>\n

Although there have been cases of compensation being paid to the families of those killed by AU troops, \u201cthe engagement I have had with CCTARC over the years indicates that it has never really functioned effectively\u201d, said Brown. \u201cThere is certainly no transparency, consistency, or predictability to these payments.\u201d<\/p>\n

Dersso, who led an assessment mission to Somalia in 2018 on the AU’s compliance with IHL and human rights, is less dismissive of CCTARC. \u201cCertainly it has its limitations, but that doesn\u2019t mean it’s functionally useless,\u201d he noted.<\/p>\n

But domestic perceptions are paramount. Most Somalis fail to differentiate between the AU\u2019s three separate missions, seeing them all as unaccountable foreign interventions, which many believe are merely a\u00a0tool of Western interests<\/span>\u00a0designed to keep Somalia dependent.<\/p>\n

\u201cAUSSOM is the same as ATMIS and AMISOM. A new name, but the same force,\u201d said Abdullahi Salah*, who alleged his vehicle was shot up, and he and three other men were detained and beaten by AU soldiers in 2023.\u00a0\u201cThis is why I won\u2019t pursue any justice \u2013 there is nothing that can be done when they do bad things to you.\u201d<\/p>\n

But the more essential problem, said Dersso, is why there is an intervention in the first place \u2013 and what that says about the more than three decades of state failure in Somalia.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe fundamentals of what\u2019s broken at the domestic political level need to be fixed,\u201d he noted. \u201cYou can\u2019t continue lurching from one mission to another. Somalis need to have a national political settlement, otherwise we will have this perpetual insecurity.\u201d<\/p>\n

* A pseudonym was requested out of fear of possible reprisal.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

With additional reporting by Obi Anyadike<\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Source: The New Humanitarian\u00a0 \u00a0Origin: view original<\/a><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A new African Union peace enforcement mission, known by its acronym AUSSOM, was launched at the beginning of the year to support a fragile Somali government that has struggled against a\u00a0jihadist insurgency\u00a0entrenched in the countryside. AUSSOM is the\u00a0third iteration\u00a0of a multinational combat force first deployed in Somalia in 2007. Yet, like its predecessors (AMISOM and …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":16075,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[24,1,10,2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-16248","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","","category-international-humanitarian-law","category-news","category-protection-cluster","category-reports"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16248","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=16248"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16248\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":16635,"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16248\/revisions\/16635"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/16075"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=16248"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=16248"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=16248"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}