{"id":15520,"date":"2024-10-23T23:12:24","date_gmt":"2024-10-23T23:12:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/?p=15520"},"modified":"2026-03-02T08:16:18","modified_gmt":"2026-03-02T08:16:18","slug":"somalia-is-changing-the-humanitarian-system-must-as-well","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/2024\/10\/23\/somalia-is-changing-the-humanitarian-system-must-as-well\/","title":{"rendered":"Somalia is changing. The humanitarian system must as well"},"content":{"rendered":"

By:<\/strong> Dustin Barter<\/a><\/span>,\u00a0Mohamed Yarrow<\/span><\/a>, and\u00a0Albashir Ibrahim<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Somalia is gripped by outdated aid systems built upon an old narrative that its crises are intractable. The country is forging a path to greater stability and better governance. Much work remains \u2013 yet it\u2019s often the humanitarian system that stands in the way of further progress.<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

This is especially true when it comes to building peace and a functioning state. As a peacebuilding practitioner told us during an interview for\u00a0our recent research<\/a>:<\/span> \u201cHumanitarians are a nightmare to work with.\u201d<\/p>\n

Somalia has experienced decades of conflict, repeated drought, and hunger \u2013 as well as decades of humanitarian appeals. There has been far greater attention on meeting Somalia\u2019s humanitarian needs since the 2011 famine, which killed more than\u00a0240,000<\/a><\/span>\u00a0people amid an inadequate international response. But Somalia has changed significantly since then, while the humanitarian system has failed to evolve.<\/p>\n

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Humanitarian scale-ups undermine peacebuilding, weaken civil society groups, and entrench international aid systems rather than complement the state.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Today, much-needed grassroots peace efforts verge on futile when humanitarian whims routinely upend communities, economies, civil society, and governance. Humanitarian scale-ups undermine peacebuilding, weaken civil society groups, and entrench international aid systems rather than complement the state.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0humanitarian-development-peace nexus<\/a>\u00a0<\/span>\u2013 the aid sector\u2019s framework to join short-term emergency aid with longer-term support \u2013 garners widespread attention. But true integrated practice has been slow to evolve in Somalia. Civil society actors \u2013 both international and national \u2013 often adopt the language of conflict sensitivity and \u201cdo no harm\u201d, yet more critical structural dynamics remain ill-addressed.<\/p>\n

Strengthening the state is critical for building population resilience. International humanitarian actors must transition from supplanting to supporting the state and Somalia\u2019s robust civil society \u2013 or risk\u00a0drifting further towards inertia<\/a>\u00a0<\/span>and neglect.<\/p>\n

Volatile funding disrupts progress<\/strong><\/p>\n

Wild fluctuations in humanitarian funding to Somalia are one of the most illustrative roadblocks to peacebuilding.<\/p>\n

A quick glance at the yearly UN-backed\u00a0humanitarian response plans<\/a><\/span>\u00a0shows the scale of the problem: Humanitarian funding may double or halve from year to year \u2013 dramatic swings that constitute 10-20% of Somalia\u2019s gross domestic product. In 2017, for example, humanitarian funding doubled from the previous year; in 2023, it was cut in half.<\/p>\n

No country in the world can effectively manage such volatility \u2013 let alone one engaged in myriad peacebuilding and conflict-resolution processes, exacerbated by climatic shocks. For comparison, 10-20% of GDP in the US would equate to fluctuations of $2.7-5.4 trillion per year \u2013 the entire US annual government budget is just over $6 trillion.<\/p>\n

How does this impact locally led peacebuilding?<\/strong><\/p>\n

In May 2018, the Somali peacebuilding organisation, the Centre for Peace and Democracy, was part of a difficult reconciliation process between two warring communities in Galkayo, Somalia\u2019s third largest city, located near the Ethiopian border in Galmudug state.<\/p>\n

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Each dialogue, often days long, builds upon the last. Gradually, tensions dissipate, problems are resolved, and peace materialises \u2013 that is, until the humanitarian assistance arrives.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The country was gripped by yet another intense drought; humanitarians were on the verge of scaling up their response. In Galkayo, tensions were high and the expansion of violent conflict felt imminent, owing to disagreement over water access between two clans.<\/p>\n

In such circumstances, peacebuilding is a process grounded in long-term trust-building and facilitating dialogue between clan elders. It requires continuity: Each dialogue, often days long, builds upon the last. Gradually, tensions dissipate, problems are resolved, and peace materialises \u2013 that is, until the humanitarian assistance arrives.<\/p>\n

In this case, clan elders were also members of relief committees and were called to distribute assistance \u2013 with the typical humanitarian urgency. Peacebuilding activities were immediately upended, as elders prioritised the more tangible benefits that humanitarians offered.<\/p>\n

The carefully planned reconciliation process collapsed, violent conflict returned, and everyone lost out. The international humanitarian organisations came and went \u2013 funding disbursed, aid delivered, consequences unknown.<\/p>\n

This happens repeatedly across Somalia. Somali actors face a constant struggle with rapid humanitarian expansions and contractions that ruin institutional continuity. This is compounded by operating in the most insecure areas to reach people in acute need. International actors are not immune \u2013 they also deal with funding fluctuations. But with their operations ensconced in comparatively safe urban areas, the impact is less severe.<\/p>\n

This funding dynamic reflects ever-changing humanitarian need to some degree. After all, donors say they\u2019re trying to prevent famine. But this volatility forces peacebuilding actors to drop everything and once again deliver humanitarian support.<\/p>\n

Somali organisations are acutely aware that humanitarian response must be coherent with peacebuilding. But the international aid system still works in silos, seemingly unable to see how emergency aid can hurt long-term sustainability.<\/p>\n

International organisations poach staff during their own expansions, compounding the difficulties. This perpetuates a vicious cycle for both communities and Somali\u00a0civil society actors<\/a>, as grassroots groups are left depleted \u2013 not strengthened \u2013 by humanitarian surge.<\/p>\n

Aid divides citizens and state<\/strong><\/p>\n

As the Somali state improves its governance and stability increases, questions about the internationally dominated humanitarian system are reaching a tipping point. Decades of international aid actors and their subcontracted Somali organisations providing basic services has entrenched their respective positions \u2013 creating a barrier between the population and the state.<\/p>\n

This was previously out of necessity, but international actors cling to this role to the detriment of strengthening state institutions. The international aid community has been here before \u2013 from\u00a0Cambodia<\/a><\/span>\u00a0to\u00a0Kenya<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n

The Somali government has demonstrated major progress, best illustrated by this year\u2019s achievement of\u00a0debt relief<\/a><\/span>. The process required meeting an array of governance and financial benchmarks, and has subsequently unlocked significant\u00a0World Bank<\/a><\/span>\u00a0budget support. Many risks remain, from ongoing insurgency to\u00a0aid diversion<\/a><\/span>\u00a0to fractious sub-national and regional relations, yet the tide is turning towards stability and a rejuvenated role for the state.<\/p>\n

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Decades of international aid actors and their subcontracted Somali organisations providing basic services has entrenched their respective positions \u2013 creating a barrier between the population and the state.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The position of many Somali civil society actors is\u00a0clear<\/a><\/span>: The government is critical to ensuring coherent and sustainable peace, development, and ultimately, the alleviation of humanitarian need.\u00a0The Nexus Consortium<\/a><\/span>\u00a0in Somalia \u2013 a platform of eight Somali organisations focused on integrated programming and thought leadership \u2013 is one of many actors continuing to advocate for this systemic shift, yet substantive change remains elusive.<\/p>\n

Renewed attention towards the state must, however, go hand-in-hand with addressing the elephant in the room: No government can manage the extreme volatility and changing scale of humanitarian funding seen in Somalia.<\/p>\n

Escaping the boom and bust cycle<\/strong><\/p>\n

Humanitarian and development needs will remain high across Somalia in the coming years. There\u2019s no simple formula to bring lasting peace and development in Somalia, but the current status quo is untenable.<\/p>\n

Long-term, stable funding is critical: Predictable funding supports institutional continuity, while better enabling thoughtful and coherent peacebuilding. It\u2019s not simply a matter of stabilising funding: Humanitarian actors must complement the state.<\/p>\n

Crises may be protracted, but emergency responses don\u2019t have to last forever. Somalia is changing. It\u2019s time for the humanitarian system to do so as well.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By: Dustin Barter,\u00a0Mohamed Yarrow, and\u00a0Albashir Ibrahim Somalia is gripped by outdated aid systems built upon an old narrative that its crises are intractable. The country is forging a path to greater stability and better governance. Much work remains \u2013 yet it\u2019s often the humanitarian system that stands in the way of further progress. This is …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":78,"featured_media":12476,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[18],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-15520","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","","category-articles"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15520","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/78"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15520"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15520\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":18775,"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15520\/revisions\/18775"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/12476"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15520"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15520"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sooha.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15520"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}